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Summary
With a political party accused of fascism in the Swedish parliament and neo-nazis marching in the 
streets, questions of democracy and freedom of expression are as important as ever. Where to draw 
the boundaries of the freedom of expression? Why have, or limit, such freedoms in the first place? 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate a possible solution to the problems facing contemporary 
democracy. This is done by constructing a conceptual framework of deliberative democracy that 
can be used to discuss questions of democracy and law, and to illustrate this framework with a 
discussion on the freedom of expression and hate speech criminalization. It is argued that this 
approach has important implications for the freedom of expression, and for the project of 
legitimizing the democratic state. A theoretical focal point for the discussion, is Habermas's The 
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere and subsequent debates. The thesis partly overlaps 
Maheila Malik's proposed model of deliberative democracy to deal with extremist groups within a 
liberal context, but stretches beyond the liberal framework by questioning the liberal derivations of 
legitimacy. The principles of modern individualism states that individuals are free and equal, and 
that the individual will is the sole source of legitimate obligation. With the conventional 
understanding of individual will as something already formed at the point of decision-making, what 
follows is the principle of unanimity, i.e. that only rules that all affected individuals can accept are 
legitimate. For practical purposes, however, this principle is substituted with the majority principle. 
This necessitates a conception of rights in order to counter the tyranny of the majority. If, instead, 
the will of the individuals is conceived of as something that is formed through the process of 
deliberation, it is suggested that the principle of participatory parity can replace the principle of 
unanimity. For rational debate in a political public sphere, private interests must be bracketed. This 
has problematic implications for the participatory parity. It is argued that bracketing serves to 
promote the interests of dominant groups. Alternative strategies for subordinate groups, such as 
organization in subaltern counterpublics, and uses of public space for contestation and 
empowerment, are discussed. However, it is argued that participatory parity requires some level of 
social equality. The discussion is illustrated with a commentary on the circumstances in the legal 
case of Pastor Green, who held a sermon on the topic “Is Homosexuality a Congenital Urge or Evil 
Powers' Play with Men?” It is concluded that freedom of expression, together with some level of 
substantive equality, is crucial to fulfilling the ideals of modern individualism. This is best achieved 
within the framework of deliberative democracy, which carries a transformative potential.
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Sammanfattning
Med ett politiskt parti anklagat för fascism i riksdagen, och nynazister marscherande på gatorna är 
frågor om demokrati och frihet viktigare än någonsin. Var bör yttrandefrihetens gränser dras? Bör 
den överhuvudtaget begränsas? Syftet med den här uppsatsen är att utforska en möjlig lösning till 
de problem som dagens demokrati står inför. Det här åstadkoms genom en konstruktion av ett 
konceptuellt ramverk, baserat på teorier om ”deliberative democracy”, som kan användas för att 
diskutera frågor om demokrati och lag, och genom att illustrera detta ramverk med en diskussion 
om yttrandefrihet och kriminalisering av ”hate speech”. Det hävdas att det här angreppssättet för 
med sig viktiga konsekvenser för yttrandefriheten, och för ansatserna att rättfärdiga den 
demokratiska staten. Det teoretiska fokuset i uppsatsen ligger på Habermas The Structural 
Transformation of the Public Sphere och den debatt som boken har väckt. Uppsatsen sammanfaller 
delvis med Maheila Maliks deliberative democracy-modell för att hantera extremistiska grupper i en 
liberal kontext, men rör sig utanför det liberala ramverket i sitt ifrågasättande av hur detta härleder 
legitimitet. Den moderna individualismens principer anger att individer är fria och jämlika samt att 
individens vilja är den enda källan för legitimitet. Av den konventionella förståelsen av vilja som 
någonting redan bestämt vid tiden för beslutsfattande följer enhällighetsprincipen, dvs. att endast de 
regler som alla berörda individer kan acceptera är legitima. För praktisk tillämpning ersätts dock 
den här principen med majoritetsprincipen. Det här nödvändiggör att rättigheter införs, för att 
motverka majoritetens tyranni. Om istället individens vilja förstås som någonting som formas i en 
resonerande process, kan förslagsvis principen om jämlikhet i deltagande (”participatory parity”) 
ersätta enhällighetsprincipen. För rationell debatt i en politisk offentlighet måste privata intressen 
sättas inom parantes (”bracketing”). Detta har problematiska konsekvenser för jämlikheten i 
deltagandet. Det anförs att sådan ”bracketing” för fram dominanta gruppers intressen. Alternativa 
strategier för underordnade grupper diskuteras, som till exempel ett organiserande i subalterna 
”counterpublics”, eller användandet av offentliga rum för att utmana ojämlikheten, och för 
”empowerment”. Det argumenteras dock för att deltagarjämlikhet kräver ett visst mått av materiell 
jämlikhet. Diskussionen illustreras med en kommentar av omständigheterna i rättsfallet Pastor 
Green, som handlar om en predikan på temat ”Ar homosexualitet en medfödd drift eller onda 
makters spel med människor?” Det konstateras att yttrandefrihet tillsammans med något mått av 
materiell jämlikhet är nödvändigt för att tillgodose den moderna individualismens ideal. Detta 
åstadkoms bäst inom ramen för ”deliberative democracy”, som bär på en transformativ potential. 
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 1 Introduction
This is the Generation of that great L E V I A T H A N, or rather (to speak more reverently) of 
that Mortall God, to which wee owe … our peace and defence.
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. XVII.
I wanna talk to you / I wanna talk to you / Hey … don't feel my world's untrue / Yeah, I wanna 
talk to you / My world can be true / I wanna talk to you
      Stevie Wonder, “I Wanna Talk to You”, Where I'm Coming From.
 1.1  General Remarks
Democracy is a heated topic in today's Sweden. With a political party accused of fascism in the 
national parliament and neo-nazis marching in the streets, questions of democracy and freedom of 
expression are as important as ever. Western democracies have long been aiming to guarantee a 
robust exchange of ideas.1 But the Western discourse seems to turn increasingly repressive, marred 
by fears of crisis, terror and the other. Where to draw the boundaries of the freedom of expression? 
Why have, or limit, such freedoms in the first place? 
In a British and international context, Professor of Law Maleiha Malik addresses the problem of 
liberal democracies not abiding to their self-professed criteria2, citing the argument that 
“[l]iberalism … is able to mask its own ideological foundations by presenting itself as the neutral 
truth about the world in which we live”.3 Against, and under the cover of, hegemonic liberal 
standards, subordinate groups are disciplined, racialized, or, in the international context, even 
tortured (as in Abu Ghraib or Guantanamo Bay).4 She proposes a framework for engaging with 
extremists, that includes the theory of deliberative democracy, and claims that it may “provide an 
invaluable and more wide-ranging opportunity to affirm and apply liberal values in domestic and 
international politics.”5 Malik constructs her model within a framework of modern liberal 
democracy. Is it possible to go further?
1 Heinze (2009a), p. 191.
2 Malik, p. 120.
3 Malik, pp. 118–9.
4 Malik, p. 119.
5 Malik, p. 120.
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 1.2  General Purpose of the Essay
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate a possible solution to the problems facing contemporary 
democracy. This will be done by constructing a conceptual framework of deliberative democracy 
that can be used to discuss questions of democracy and law, and to illustrate this framework with a 
discussion on the freedom of expression. The conceptual framework will be based on theories of 
deliberative democracy, and I will argue that this approach has important implications for the 
freedom of expression, and for the project of legitimizing the democratic state.
 1.3  Problematic
To fulfill the stated purpose, I will answer the following questions:
– What could a model of deliberative democracy look like?
– What would a concept of legitimacy entail in such a model?  
To illustrate this, I will discuss the implications of the model for the freedom of expression, and 
also make a brief comment on a Swedish legal case.
 1.4  Delimitations 
As my approach is wide, and discusses the entire democratic project, I will not go into any depths 
on a variety of matters. I will focus the discussion on matters of legitimacy, the public sphere, and 
freedom of expression, and leave out the implications of my model in other areas, for instance 
criminal law, the project of nationalism, war, international human rights, constitutional law or 
corporate law.
 1.5  Materials
Habermas's The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere contains both a historical narrative 
of the rise and fall of the bourgeois public sphere, and a normative conception of the public sphere 
which may serve as a basis of contemporary discussions on the matter.6 In STPS, Habermas argues 
that the political public sphere was first conceived by the bourgeois classes of Enlightenment 
Europe. While this historical analysis has been the target of much critique7, STPS does provide a 
theoretical starting point for my analysis. The book has even been called “an indispensable point of 
6 Hohendahl, p. 99, Calhoun, p. 39, cf. Habermas (1991), p. 232.
7 Cf. Eley, p. 306, Garnham, p. 359, Fraser, p. 115–6.
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theoretical departure”.8 As I will argue below (with the help of many a theorist, including Habermas 
himself9), the conception of the public sphere in STPS is in need of some modification, but has 
spurred a rich discussion on the topic and will serve as a theoretical focal point for this thesis, 
together with a variety of texts on deliberative democracy and on freedom of expression. To 
mention a few, I will make use of the articles in Habermas and the Public Sphere, edited by Craig 
Calhoun and published on the occasion of the English translation of STPS, and those in Extreme 
Speech and Democracy, edited by Ivan Hare and James Weinstein, and John Stuart Mill's classic 
On Liberty. 
 1.6  Methodology and Theoretical Framework 
In this thesis, I will treat matters of political philosophy and the philosophy of law. My approach is 
conceptual and vertical, to the extent that I will construct a model starting with its very 
justifications, arriving at the implications it carries for the freedom of expression, and finally 
illustrate these with an actual legal case.
Habermas's account in STPS is both historical/scholarly and normative/political.10 My aim in this 
thesis is to abstract a model from the more normative/political aspects of Habermas's theory and the 
subsequent discussions. 
 1.7 Previous Research
Malik, in a chapter of Extreme Speech and Democracy, proposes a model of deliberative democracy 
to deal with extremist groups within a liberal context. While this thesis will be partly overlapping 
Malik's text, my ambition is to contribute something new besides Malik's argument, with a different 
approach, including a greater focus on the legitimacy of the democratic project. I will integrate 
Malik's discussion on extremism in the thesis.
 1.8  Structure
Following this introduction, the treatise part will commence with a chapter discussing the different 
theories of democracy, and the matter of legitimacy. The next chapter deals with the public sphere, 
starting with Habermas's initial conception, and then developing the theory. In the subsequent 
chapter, questions of participation, truth and rationality will be highlighted. After this follows a 
8 Calhoun, p. 41.
9 Cf. Habermas's response to his critics in Habermas (1992).
10 Boyte, p. 343. 
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chapter focusing on Malik's model, which she argues entails alternatives to rationality. Then follows 
a chapter on the topic of hate speech bans, in which the Swedish case of Pastor Green will be 
introduced. Finally, the treatise part of the thesis will be concluded with a discussion on the 
transformative potential of deliberation. Concluding the thesis, the last part consists of discussions 
on legitimacy, deliberation and the implications of this model, including an illustrative discussion of 
the case of Pastor Green.
Each chapter will be concluded with a summary of its important points.
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 2  Treatise
 2.1 Foundations––the Legitimacy of the Democratic State 
 2.1.1 Background: Gutmann on Theories of Democracy
Amy Gutmann's chapter on democracy will serve as a starting point for the discussion. Gutmann 
recalls Winston Churchill's famous words as the strongest general justification for democracy, “that 
it is the worst form of government except all others”.11 She discusses six types of democracy.
First, she describes Schumpeterian democracy, based on Joseph Schumpeter's procedural, minimal 
definition of democracy as “that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in 
which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for people's 
vote”.12 Gutmann points out that such “procedural minimalism entails forsaking democracy as an 
ideal”,13 permitting many consequences that would seem foreign to individuals of contemporary 
Western democracies. 
The next version, still with a procedural focus, but with some substantive content, is that of populist  
democracy. Here, “popular rule is the ultimate political value”.14 This conception contains the ideal 
of modern individualism,15 that individuals are free and equal, which puts some constraints on the 
popular government. These constraints are “free speech, press and association necessary for 
political freedom; the rule of law, as contrasted to the arbitrary will of public officials; formal 
voting equality”16 and universal suffrage. 
Third, Gutmann describes what she names liberal democracy, as qualifying “the value of popular 
rule by recognizing a set of basic liberties that take priority over popular rule and its conditions”.17 
This allows for further constrictions on popular rule, such as judicial review, checks and balances 
and separation of powers, all to guarantee the rights and freedoms of individuals––and minorities––
against majoritarian rule.18 For Mill, these rights also apply between individuals.19 Mill wrote this 
11 Gutmann, p. 522.
12 Gutmann, p. 522, quoting Schumpeter, Joseph (1943). Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, p. 269. London: 
George Allen & Unwin. 
13 Gutmann, p. 522.
14 Gutmann, p. 523.
15 Cf. Manin, p. 340, and the discussion on legitimacy below.
16 Gutmann, p. 522.
17 Gutmann, p. 523–4.
18 Gutmann, p. 524.
19 Mill, p. 141–4
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on the limits of liberty:20 
The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, 
so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it … 
Mankind are greater gainers by suffering each other to live as seems good to themselves, than 
by compelling each to live as seems good to the rest.
Tamanaha identifies four basic liberties in modern liberal democracies. These are: political liberty 
(meaning self-rule, individuals rule themselves through democratic laws); legal liberty (the 
dominant understanding of the rule of law, or liberty to do whatever the law permits,); personal 
liberty (procedural or substantive restrictions on government infringement “upon an inviolable 
realm of personal autonomy”,21 also knows as human or civil rights), and; the institutionalized 
preservation of liberty (horizontal and vertical separation of powers of government to prevent 
concentrations of power).22 These liberties would be manifest to some extent in a popular 
democracy as well, but enjoy a more instrumental status. Gutmann argues that popular democracy 
and liberal democracy are in practice quite similar, diverging “only when confronted with a conflict 
between popular rule and those basic liberties that are not conditions of democracy”.23 She gives the 
example of apolitical hard-core pornography. For the liberal democrat, restrictions on the freedom 
of expression is principally wrong. For the populist democrat, restrictions in accordance with the 
majority will may be placed on apolitical expressions. Against such restrictions, the populist 
democrat may give the “slippery slope” argument: that the restriction (in this example) gives the 
government opportunity to regulate pornographic expressions with political content. But even if this 
would not be the case, Gutmann argues, the principal difference remains the same––that there will 
be cases where a populist democracy may restrict the freedom of expression according to 
community standards without encroaching on political freedoms.24
The fourth version of democracy discussed by Gutmann, is participatory democracy. Inspired by 
the ancient Greek democracy, proponents of participatory democracy downplay the liberal focus on 
personal freedom and stresses the value of participation, that individuals should participate in 
politics to a greater extent. Participatory democracy, argues Gutmann, can be understood as a 
20 Mill, p. 23.
21 Tamanaha, p. 35. This personal liberty coincides with the human liberties as defined by Mill, pp. 22–3: liberty of 
conscience (including all kinds of thought and expression); liberty of tastes and pursuits, and; liberty of combination 
among individuals (freedom of assembly). 
22 Tamanaha, pp. 34–5.
23 Gutmann, p. 524.
24 Gutmann, p. 524–5. This is not to say that self-proclaimed liberal democracies abide to these principles. Indeed, 
Heinze (2009a) on p. 192 discusses this very problem: the US Supreme Court upholding prohibitions on apolitical 
obscene materials. The view that certain (political) types of speech should enjoy more state protection is, of course, 
common, cf. Weinstein, p. 30.
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response to the many problems of democratic accountability facing todays large-scale 
representative democracies, presenting participation as “a necessary means to a good society, and 
an essential part of the good life”.25
The fifth form of democracy is social democracy. In such democracies, the problem of the tyranny 
of the majority, the focus of many liberals, is modified into a resistance against the tyranny of 
concentrations of power threatening all individuals. The logic of liberal democracy is extended “to 
realms that traditional liberals considered private and therefore not subject to democratic 
principles”.26 Thus, realms like the economic and that of the family are subject to democratization.27 
The formal equality of liberalism is balanced with its substantive counterpart. 
The final version of democracy discussed, and the version promoted (with reservations) by 
Gutmann, is that of deliberative democracy. This version integrates the ideals of populist and liberal 
democracy––popular rule and individual freedom––as “valuable to the extent that they express or 
support individual autonomy”, defined as “the willingness and ability of persons to shape their lives 
through rational deliberation”.28 Gutmann grants that this may be the more compelling form of 
democracy, if only it is possible to construct “institutions of public accountability [that] 
encourage[s] deliberation about public issues that affect people's lives”.29 Deliberative democracy 
has some important implications for the question of legitimacy. Let us delve deeper into this matter.
 2.1.2 Legitimacy
Liberal and democratic discussions on the legitimacy of the state focus on the principle of 
unanimity; only rules that all individuals can accept are legitimate.30 An extreme liberal position, 
according to Manin, is that “[t]he liberty of individuals is identified with their security; protected 
from coercion by others, every individual may freely seek happiness as he understands it … as long 
as this exercise of his freedom does not encroach upon the freedom of his fellows.”31 As this 
principle of liberty is all that can be legitimized through unanimous decision, only a minimal state is 
possible––and legitimate.32
25 Gutmann, p. 525–6. Quote on p. 526.
26 Gutmann, p. 526.
27 Gutmann, p. 526–7.
28 Gutmann, p. 527.
29 Gutmann, p. 528.
30 Manin, p. 338. The principle of unanimity reminds the nostalgic reader of Hobbes classic generation of the 
commonwealth, cf. Hobbes, chs. XIII, XIV and XVII.
31 Manin, p. 338.
32 Manin, p. 339.
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Rawls's veil of ignorance is an attempt to justify a broader conception of the state, that provides 
some positive freedom––actual means––to pursue happiness.33 But the unanimous agreement still 
provides the foundation, and the only foundation, of legitimacy.34 
Manin traces this “project of basing political legitimacy on unanimity” to the “fundamental 
principles of modern individualism”: that individuals are free and equal, and thus the legitimate 
basis from which all political power flows can be only the will of these individuals.35 This original 
postulate can be formulated as such: “the individual will is the sole source of legitimate 
obligation”.36 This individualism forms the basis, not only for liberalism, but also for other modern 
democratic theories.37 
The principle of legitimacy by unanimity makes necessary a principle for effective decision making. 
This is the majority principle. But this practical substitute does not meet the mentioned 
requirements of modern individualism.38 This solution, argues Manin, that majority will “must be 
considered as the equivalent of unanimous will”, is an “untenable fiction”.39 This fiction, in the 
conception of early liberalism, was problematized as the “tyranny of the majority”.40
Manin argues that in both Rousseau and Rawls, the will of the free individual, from which 
legitimacy and political obligation flows, at the point of deliberation is already determined.41 Manin 
agrees with the project of the liberals, that “the problem consists … in finding out how it is possible 
to constitute a collective entity that does not violate the freedom of individuals.”42 He thus agrees 
with the individualist premise, but criticizes the assumption that individuals already know exactly 
what they want at the point of deliberation. His claim is that will is finally formed through the very 
process of deliberation. Thus, Manin poses the following definition of legitimacy:43
It is necessary to alter radically the perspective common to both liberal theories and democratic 
thought: the source of legitimacy is not the predetermined will of individuals, but rather the 
process of its formation, that is, deliberation itself. . . . A legitimate decision does not represent 
the will of all, but is one that results from the deliberation of all. It is the process by which 
everyone's will is formed that confers its legitimacy on the outcome, rather than the sum of 
already formed wills. The deliberative principle is both individualist and democratic. . . . We 
33 Manin, p. 339.
34 Manin, p. 340–1.
35 Manin, p. 340.
36 Manin, p. 342.
37 Manin, p. 341. Cf. 2.1.1 above.
38 Manin, p. 341–4
39 Manin, p. 360.
40 Habermas 1992, p. 440–1, referring to Tocqueville and Mill. Cf. Mill, p. 7.
41 Manin, p. 344–51.
42 Manin, p. 351. Cf. 
43 Manin, p. 351–2, as quoted by Habermas (1992), p. 446.
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must affirm, at the risk of contradicting a long tradition, that legitimate law is the result of 
general deliberation, and not the expression of general will.
In liberal theory the individual will is the source of legitimacy. For a democratic decision to be truly 
legitimate, unanimity is required. To Habermas, the notion of deliberative democracy is grounded in 
the ideal of equal citizens arguing publicly to decide on matters concerning their association. He 
cites the above quote by Manin. The deliberative process is the very root of democratic legitimacy.44 
 2.1.3 Summary
In this chapter I have dealt with different theories of democracy and the question of legitimacy. 
Democracy can be conceived as a procedural matter, as in a Schumpeterian or in a populist theory. 
Substantive notions of democracy takes a bigger place in the liberal theory, in the form of civil 
rights. While certain liberties are vested with an instrumental status in popular democracy for the 
sake of free political discourse, in a liberal democracy, they are placed above the more procedural 
values, and function as constraints on the majority rule, and also regulates the relations between 
individuals. Participatory democracy stresses the value of participation in politics for democratic 
accountability. Social democracy extends the liberal logic with even more substantive content, 
stressing social equality. The perceived evil is concentrations of power throughout society. 
Deliberative democracy, finally, may carry the potential of integrating and realizing many of the 
democratic ideals of the other theories.
In the discussion on legitimacy, a few ideals have been noted. The principles of modern 
individualism states that individuals are free and equal, and that the individual will is the sole 
source of legitimate obligation. From these principles derives the principle of unanimity, that only 
rules that all affected individuals can accept are legitimate. This principle is the foundation of most 
democratic thought. But it makes necessary a principle for effective decision-making: the majority 
principle. Thus, in the name of pragmatism, the will of all is substituted with the will of the 
majority. This fiction gives rise to the tyranny of the majority, which in its turn gives rise to the 
need for civil rights (next to their function as regulating relations between individuals). But rights 
can be criticized as undemocratic, since they constrain popular rule.
They problem consists of how to construe a collective entity that does not violate the freedom of 
individuals, or how to realize a legitimate association according to the principles of individualism. 
In conventional theories of democracy, including those of social and liberal democracy, individual 
44 Habermas (1992), pp. 446–7. Cf. Habermas (1991), p. 180.
14
will is conceived as something already formed at the point of decision-making. This assumption 
underlies the principle of unanimity. But will can in fact be formed through the process of 
deliberation. Legitimate rule, in that case, is the result of general deliberation, and not the 
expression of general will. 
A deliberative concept of democratic legitimacy, rooted in the individualist principle, could be 
formulated as equal opportunity to participate in the public political deliberation, or what Fraser 
calls participatory parity.45 But where would such deliberation take place?
 2.2 The public sphere(s)––leveling the field
 2.2.1 Habermas's Concept of the Public Sphere
The deliberative process has to take place somewhere. This would be in a public sphere. What is 
this concept? Sometimes, it can even seem almost frightening:46
The ‘public sphere’ of open, democratic discourse is a real, yet also ineffable thing. We cannot 
draw a neat line around it, showing where it stops and starts. The realities that shape it do not 
reduce to the formal norms governing it.
But let us try to define it. According to Habermas, the public sphere is “first of all a realm of our 
social life in which something approaching public opinion can be formed”.47 The principle of the 
public sphere is that of critical publicity.48 When the object of this critical, public discussion is 
related to matters of the state, the public sphere becomes political.49 In Habermas's initial account, 
the (idealized) political function of the public sphere is stated as such: “that of subjecting the affairs 
that it had made public to the control of a critical public”.50 
It is as private individuals coming together that we form portions of the public sphere. That is, when 
we “behave neither like business or professional people transacting private affairs, not like members 
of a constitutional order subject to the legal constraints of a state bureaucracy”.51 Eley summarizes 
45 Cf. Fraser, section 3, or below, section 2.2.2.
46 Heinze (2009a), p. 203.
47 Habermas (1974), p. 49.
48 Habermas (1991), p. 140.
49 Habermas (1974), p. 49. Through this essay I use the terms “public sphere” or “political public sphere” 
interchangeably, to signify the latter, unless stated elsewise.
50 Habermas (1991), p. 140.
51 Habermas (1974), p. 49. Cf. Habermas (1991), p. 222.
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the concept as such:52
In a nutshell, the public sphere means “a sphere which mediates between society and state, in 
which the public organizes itself as the bearer of public opinion”.
Thus, the public sphere is separate from the state, and from the private economic sphere. Habermas 
also separates the economic sphere of the market, naming it the private sphere, from that of the 
family, the intimate sphere.53 For the public debate to be rational, we have to put our private 
interests aside. A kind of bracketing of social inequalities is necessary.54 The aim is not to reach a 
compromise between particular interests, relegated to a private sphere, but, by the means of 
rational-critical public debate, to reach a consensus that can provide a rational justification for 
political domination.55 As McCarthy puts it, the ultimate moral-political significance of Habermas's 
”agreement based on reasons is to provide an alternative to open or latent coercion as a means of 
social coordination”.56 This, on another, more basic level, presupposes “a possible consensus, that 
is, the possibility of an objective agreement among competing interests in accord with universal and 
binding criteria”.57 Structural conflicts of interest are to be relativized on the basis of agreement on 
an universal interest.58
Fraser summarizes Habermas's concept in two categories: “at one level the idea of the public sphere 
designated an institutional mechanism for rationalizing political domination by rendering states 
accountable to (some of) the citizenry … At another level, it designated a specific kind of discursive 
interaction.”59 
Habermas modeled this ideal of the public sphere on the historical bourgeois public spheres of 
Enlightenment Europe. Based on circles of literary critique amongst the bourgeois, the discussions 
turned more and more political.60 It becomes apparent that “[s]uch a theory … must be aware of its 
historical context”.61 As Hohendahl puts it: “there is no single model of the public sphere, rather 
different societies have developed a variety of models with specific institutional and formal 
52 Eley, p. 290.
53 Habermas (1991), p. 55.
54 Habermas (1991), pp. 179, and 234. Cf. Fraser's discussion, recaptured below in section 2.2.2.1, for the term 
“bracketing”.
55 Habermas (1991), pp. 179 and 180. 
56 McCarthy, p. 66.
57 Habermas (1991), p. 234.
58 Habermas (1991), p. 235.
59 Fraser, p. 112.
60 Cf. Habermas (1991), parts I, II and III.
61 Postone, p. 175. Of course, Habermas aim is to use his historical analysis to say something about contemporary 
issues, cf. Kramer, p. 257, or Boyte, p. 343.
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(procedural) feature”.62 Indeed, Habermas's conception has been the subject of critique among 
different writers because of its exclusionary implications. Let us delve deeper into a part of this 
critique.
 2.2.2 Towards a Modified Concept of the Public Sphere
Boyte calls for a renewal of Habermas's deliberative citizenry, and argues that such a renewal 
should focus on “political education for action in public sphere [sic!] based more on the reworking 
of existing, mainstream settings and institutions than on the creation of counterinstitutions on the 
one hand or protest groups and new social movements on the other”.63 Boyte, who draws from 
American experience, is skeptical towards the latter kind of solutions, claiming that they lead, and 
indeed have lead to moral simplifications and excessively ideological politics, where one's own 
group and the opponents are perceived in terms of good and evil. While the new social movements 
have a participatory flavor, this kind of politics makes difficult any attempt at discussion with 
opposing groups, and results in “a restriction of any possibility for a genuine public sphere”.64 The 
key to democratization today is, Boyte concludes, by means of a different political education, “the 
development of a widespread sensibility and experience of citizen agency and authority, with the 
responsibilities and capacities those entail”.65
I contend that there does not have to be a contradiction between the politics of new social 
movements and a democratization of society. While the furthering of one general public sphere may 
be crucial for political deliberation on a greater societal level, the existence of a multiplicity of 
public spheres can be just as crucial for the opportunity of members of marginalized groups to 
participate in the political process. For this argument, let us turn to Nancy Fraser.
Fraser contends that Habermas's conception of the public sphere “is not adequate for the critique of 
the limits of actually existing democracy in late-capitalist societies”.66 She still takes for a basic 
premise that Habermas's concept of the public sphere is an essential conceptual resource to critical 
theory and democratic political practice, but in need of some reconstruction.67 She criticizes four 
assumptions that are constitutive for Habermas's conception, and gives corresponding tasks to a 
critical theory of existing democracy. 
62 Hohendahl, p. 107. Cf. Zaret, p. 230, on the implications of the historical fact of a multiplicity of public spheres next 
to the liberal/bourgeois one.
63 Boyte, p. 353.
64 Boyte, p. 350.
65 Boyte, p. 353.
66 Fraser, p. 136.
67 Fraser, p. 111. Cf. Ryan, p. 260, on the advantages of Habermas's theory for feminists.
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 2.2.2.1 Bracketing of Inequalities vs. the Necessity of Equality
Firstly, Fraser argues that it is not enough for social inequalities to be merely bracketed in a public 
sphere; they must be (to some extent) eliminated. The ways in which bracketing taints deliberation 
should be rendered visible.68 
The participants of the historical bourgeois public sphere “bracketed” their inequalities to enable 
rational discussion, but as the “protocols of style and decorum” governing that sphere functioned as 
markers of statuses, members of minority groups (such as women and working class men) were 
marginalized, although informally.69 Fraser stresses the importance of recognizing the informal 
aspects of deliberation; in fact, formal and legal license of participation, in combination with 
informal impediments, may result in that the deliberative process, formally equal, “can serve as a 
mask for domination”.70 She suggests that a strategy of unbracketing inequalities may in fact prove 
advantageous for subordinate groups. She claims that this is also in line with the spirit of the later 
works of Habermas.71 While the liberal project struggles to insulate the political process from 
substantive inequalities to ensure equal participation, Fraser argues that circumstances suggest that 
some degree of actual social equality is a precondition for participatory parity.72 A recent study by 
Gilens and Page, proclaiming that the US perhaps no longer should be considered a democracy, but 
rather that it is an oligarchy, seems to support this argument. The study shows that an economic 
elite in American society in fact controls political policy-making. In spite of electoral rights and 
liberal freedoms, the political reality is that “[w]hen a majority of citizens disagrees with economic 
elites or with organized interests, they generally lose”.73 Habermas would call this generalized 
particularism, defined as “the privileged assertion of local and group-specific special interests that, 
from Burke to Weber, Schumpeter, and today's neoconservatives, has provided the arguments of a 
democratic elitism”.74 Thus, in the words of Fraser: “Pace liberalism, then, political democracy 
requires substantive social equality.”75 
68 Fraser, p. 136–7.
69 Fraser, p. 118–9.
70 Fraser, p. 119.
71 Fraser, p. 120. Cf. Discussion below on truth and rationality, section 2.3.2. This is also in line with the spirit of Mill, 
who stresses the value of diverging opinions, cf. for instance his discussion on pp. 88–9.
72 Fraser, p. 121.
73 Giles and Page, p. 576.
74 Habermas (1992), p. 451.
75 Fraser, p. 121. Cf. the words of Cassegård (p. 693): “[W]hile bracketing creates a democratic or egalitarian 
semblance, it also prevents real inequalities in power, wealth, and status from being challenged” or Heinze (2009a), 
pp. 192–5. Fraser's “political democracy” is similar to Tamanaha's (p. 34) “political liberty”, meaning “self-rule”; 
that “the individual is free to the extent that the laws are created democratically”. 
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 2.2.2.2 A Multiplicity of Publics
Secondly, Fraser argues that “the ideal of participatory parity is better achieved by a multiplicity of 
publics than by a single public”.76 This goes for both stratified and egalitarian societies. A critical 
theory “should show how inequality affects relations among publics … how publics are 
differentially empowered or segmented, and how some are involuntarily enclaved and subordinated 
to others”.77 Fraser defines a stratified society as a society “whose basic framework … generate[s] 
unequal social groups in structural relations of dominance and subordination”.78 
Fraser contend that, as a consequence of her above mentioned analysis of the need for social 
equality in a democracy,79 “in stratified societies, arrangements that accommodate contestation 
among a plurality of competing publics better promote the ideal of participatory parity than does a 
single, comprehensive, overarching public”.80 In a stratified society, Fraser argues, the creation of 
what she calls subaltern counterpublics “has been found to be advantageous for members of 
subordinated social groups”.81 Counterpublics help to expand the discursive space, by publicly 
contesting assumptions previously exempted from the debate. This function is performed even if the 
counterpublic is anti-democratic and anti-egalitarian, as long as it has emerged as a “response to 
exclusions within dominant publics”.82 Fraser then problematizes the issue of separatism. As long as 
the orientation of counterpublics is publicist, and they constitute publics, they do not constitute 
enclaves (“which is not to deny that they are often involuntarily enclaved”), because of the inclusive 
potential inherent in the self-identification as a (potentially wider) public.83 Fraser identifies a 
dialectic between two functions subaltern counterpublics in stratified societies, namely between 
their “function as spaces of withdrawal and regroupment”, and their “function as bases and training 
grounds for agitational activities directed toward wider publics”. This is where “their emancipatory 
potential resides”; it enables them to counteract “the unjust participatory privileges enjoyed by 
members of dominant social groups”.84
76 Fraser, p. 127. Cf. pp. 121 and 122. 
77 Fraser, p. 136–7.
78 Fraser, p. 125. Here, I have reversed Fraser's definition of nonstratified societies: “societies whose basic framework 
does not generate unequal social groups in structural relations of dominance and subordination”.
79 Cf. section 2.2.2.1.
80 Fraser 122.
81 Fraser, p. 123.
82 Fraser, p. 124.
83 Fraser, p. 124. Cf. Habermas (1991), pp. 31–43, or Ryan, p. 285, who concludes that “women's assiduous efforts to 
win and practice the right of public access is an example of the practical ways in which the public ideal has 
maintained its resilience over time, that is, through a progressive incorporation of once-marginalized groups into the 
public sphere.” 
84 Fraser, p. 124. This theme will be developed below in section 2.2.3, with the aid of Cassegård.
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In egalitarian, multicultural societies, a multiplicity of public spheres is necessary by definition, as 
they, constitute “the arenas for the formation and enactment of social identities”, beside their 
function of “the formation of discursive opinion”.85 But there would still have to exist a limited 
comprehensive public sphere, where debates across the lines of cultural diversity could be 
conducted on issues that concern all. Fraser argues that such a sphere is possible as a participatory 
democracy, but suggests that even though she sees no conceptual barriers against such a public 
sphere, its construction is an empirical, rather than conceptual, question. In conclusion, she states 
that an egalitarian multicultural society “will necessarily be a society with many different publics, 
including at least one public in which participants can deliberate as peers across lines of difference 
about policy that concerns them all”.86 
 2.2.2.3 Conceptions of Private and Public 
Thirdly, Fraser argues “that a tenable conception of the public sphere must countenance not the 
exclusion, but the inclusion, of interests and issues that bourgeois, masculinist ideology labels 
'private' and treats as inadmissible”. The “ways in which the labeling of some issues and interests as 
'private' limits the range of”, and possible approaches to, problems, should be exposed.87 
Fraser identifies several different senses of “public” with a corresponding “private” in Habermas's 
conception. She mentions “public” as “(1) state-related, (2) accessible to everyone, (3) of concern to 
everyone, and (4) pertaining to a common good or shared interest”, and adds two more meanings of 
“private”, as “(5) pertaining to private property in a market economy and (6) pertaining to intimate 
domestic or personal life, including sexual life”.88 “Public” as accessible to all was dealt with in 
Fraser's discussion on the multiplicity of publics. On the meaning of “public” as “of concern of 
everyone”, she states that whether a matter concerns one or not, must be decided by the participant's 
themselves. Therefore, which matters should be debated publicly cannot be decided in advance: 
“democratic publicity requires positive guarantees of opportunities for minorities to convince others 
that what in the past was not public in the sense of being a matter of common concern should now 
become so.”89 Criticizing the implications of the sense of “publicity” as pertaining to a common 
good or shared interest, Fraser argues that “the existence of a common good cannot be presumed in 
advance”, and, therefore, no matters should be precluded from public debate on such grounds.90
85 Fraser, p. 125–6, quotes on p. 125.
86 Fraser, pp. 126–127, quote on p. 127.
87 Fraser, p. 137.
88 Fraser, p. 128.
89 Fraser, p. 129.
90 Fraser, p. 129–131, quote on p. 130.
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Fraser thus points out that the terms “public” and “private” are no mere designators of societal 
spheres, but powerful tools of political discourse “frequently deployed to delegitimate some 
interests, views, and topics and to valorize others”.91 “Private” in the senses of pertaining to private 
property in a market economy, or intimate domestic or personal life, including sexual life, are “at 
the center of a rhetoric of privacy that has historically been used to restrict the universe of 
legitimate public contestation”, to the advantage of dominant groups.92 This is, to Fraser, another 
argument showing that the formal right of participation in public debate (the public sphere) does not 
“ensure inclusion in practice”.93 The advantages of dominant groups lives on informally. 
The argument of this section is clearly formulated, as follows, by Benhabib:94 
All struggles against oppression in the modern world begin by redefining what had previously 
been considered private, nonpublic, and nonpolitical issues as matters of public concern, as 
issues of justice, as sites of power that need discursive legitimation.
 2.2.2.4 Blurred Lines (Between State and Society)
Lastly, Fraser discusses “the assumption that a functioning democratic public sphere requires a 
sharp separation of civil society and the state”.95 
In Habermas's description of the ideal of the liberal public sphere, it is a “realm of private people 
assembled into a public who, as the citizenry, linked up the state with the needs of civil society 
according to the idea that in the medium of this public sphere political authority would be 
transformed into rational authority”.96 It is, in the words of Fraser, precisely the “extragovernmental 
character of the public sphere that confers an aura of independence, autonomy, and legitimacy on 
the 'public opinion' generated in it”.97 But she challenges Habermas's concept of the public sphere as 
separate from the state (together with the liberal insistence on a sharp division of state and society). 
Fraser names those associations of civil society that do not have decision making power, but only 
serve an opinion-forming function, weak publics. Sovereign parliament, with the ideal function as a 
public sphere within the state, i.e. with decision making power, she names strong publics. In 
contrast to Habermas's conception, this approach, argues Fraser, enables a discussion of both kinds 
of institutions, and their interrelations, in a democratic society: “any conception of the public sphere 
91 Fraser, p. 131.
92 Fraser, p. 131.
93 Fraser, p. 131.
94 Benhabib (1992), p. 84.
95 Fraser, p. 132.
96 Habermas (1991) p. 222.
97 Fraser, p. 134.
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that requires a sharp separation between (associational) civil society and the state will be unable to 
imagine the forms of self-management, interpublic coordination, and political accountability that 
are essential to a democratic and egalitarian society”.98 I will add that Fraser's concepts of weak and 
strong publics does not seem to interfere with a maintaining of the sharp distinction between those 
concepts and the state, if the state is understood in terms of the executive and judicial powers. 
Fraser concludes that a conception of the public sphere “must allow both for strong publics and for 
weak publics … [and] should help theorize the relations among them”.99 
Later in his career, Habermas seems to move in a direction similar to Fraser's. He writes that the 
political public sphere requires not only a free political culture, but the institutions to support it. 
And these have to be unsubverted by power––the political public sphere requires a civil society of 
opinion-forming associations.100 What Habermas describes matches Fraser's term of “weak publics”. 
This civil society, a term which no longer means the economic sphere, is constituted by “voluntary 
unions outside the realm of the state and the economy”.101 He states that examples of such 
associations of opinion-forming function, range “from churches, cultural associations, and 
academies to independent media, sport and leisure clubs, debating societies, groups of concerned 
citizens, and grassroots petitioning drives all the way to occupational associations, political parties, 
labor unions, and 'alternative institutions'”.102 Habermas points to the fact that these associations are 
not parts of the administrative system, but still have impact on the public debate, be it through the 
media or through other activities. The line, then, seems to be drawn somewhere around political 
parties, which, as Habermas notes, tend to become fused with the state.103 Now, let us develop the 
discussion on counterpublics, and the realms of their struggles.
 2.2.3 Alternative Spaces for Contestation and Empowerment
 2.2.3.1 Dimensions of Publicity
Cassegård summarize the ideal of the public sphere as such:104
This idea of political will-formation through debate and discussion is informed by the idea that 
the public sphere must be an arena of free and open contestation; publicness requires that no 
issue or argument is banned.
98 Fraser, p. 134–136, quote on p. 136. 
99 Fraser, p. 137.
100Habermas (1992), p. 453–4.
101Habermas (1992), p. 453.
102Habermas (1992), p. 453–4.
103Habermas (1992), p. 454.
104Cassegård, p. 693.
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He argues that there are limits for which political practices are allowed within the deliberations of 
the public sphere. Instead, marginal or subordinate groups turn to two types of public spaces to 
challenge mainstream norms and to further processes of empowerment. Cassegård aims “to clarify 
in what sense space is seen as playing a crucial role in particular political practices and whether or 
not an idea of a public sphere can be articulated in which such practices are recognized as 
legitimate”.105 
For his analysis, Cassegård makes use of two dimensions of publicness that he argues are central 
thinkers like Habermas and Arendt:106
– In one conception, publicness arises when egalitarian arenas of interaction are created by a 
systematic bracketing of inequality. Publics, in other words, arise when participants 
systematically disregard real differences and relations of dependency in order to create a 
semblance of equality between participants. 
– In the other conception, it is rather by contestation, by openly challenging exclusion and 
inequality, that genuine publicness can occur. 
Cassegård draws on Fraser's discussion on bracketing, cited above,107 and stresses the point “that 
both of these dimensions can be understood as indicating publicness”.108 The two dimensions of 
publicness are not necessary incompatible, but their distinction if necessary for Cassegård's further 
analysis.109
 2.2.3.2 Public Spaces
Cassegård focuses on two conceptions of public space. The first conception is that of a 
counterspace, a space for the public manifestation of, and made public by, dissent and contestation. 
This space lacks the orientation of rationality and consensus that defines Habermas's public sphere. 
This relates to a concept of “democracy as an interminable work of creating polemical situations 
where power is challenged in the name of everybody’s equal worth”,110 where it is crucial for 
subordinate groups to be able to breach, upset and even shatter the discursive field. Bracketing in 
the existing forms of the public sphere is challenged with techniques of unbracketing.111
But bracketing can also serve the empowerment of subaltern groups, in such alternative spaces that 
105Cassegård, pp. 690–692, quote on p. 692.
106Cassegård, p. 691. These two dimensions are apparent in Fraser's discussion, cited above in section 2.2.2.2.
107Cf. above, section 2.2.2.1.
108Cassegård, p. 694.
109Cassegård, p. 694.
110Cassegård, p. 694.
111Cassegård, p. 694–5.
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Cassegård names no-man’s-land. This is an alternative norm for bracketing, that governs the 
interactions amongst strangers and make their diversity agreeable. Empowerment is provided in the 
form of protection. Members of subordinate groups may be strangers to each other, but they can 
retreat to a no-man’s-land without being questioned, exchange information and attend to their daily 
needs.112 The example Cassegård gives is that of a hobo camp, where “hobo life is temporarily freed 
from its stigma, since the social norms that underlie stigmatization are suspended”.113 In contrast to 
counterspaces, these spaces “feed on the inattention or neglect by mainstream society”.114 Necessary 
for the survival of the members of the subordinate group, this is also where they conduct business 
that mainstream people conduct in their private spheres.115
This shows, Cassegård argues, “that principles of bracketing are not uniform for society as a whole, 
but plural, and that they vary depending on context”.116 In the context of counterpublics, “alternative 
principles of bracketing” can serve to “create a semblance of equality among their own participants
—a semblance which helps them to function as places of refuge”.117 It is often in spaces like these, 
that “more openly political counterpublics” can form.118 
The historical bourgeois public sphere, in Habermas's conception, could perhaps be understood as a 
space in this way, although with a different kind of spatiality. From the beginning, perhaps 
bracketing has only been employed successfully within already roughly equal groups. In the light of 
Fraser's above mentioned argument, that bracketing only serves the dominant groups within a 
public sphere, this reasoning returns to the conclusion that some level of social equality is a 
necessary condition for participation in a public sphere (where rational-critical debate is conducted 
with the help of bracketing).
 2.2.3.3 Implications for the Public Sphere
After discussing these two dimensions of publicity and their functions in the public spaces of 
subaltern counterpublics, Cassegård concludes that in the classical notion of the public sphere of 
Habermas and Arendt, the two dimensions typically coincide: “bracketing is employed in order to 
facilitate communication, while at the same time contestation tends to be contained by being limited 
112Cassegård, p. 696–7.
113Cassegård, p. 697.
114Cassegård, p. 697.
115Cassegård, p. 698.
116Cassegård, p. 698.
117Cassegård, p. 698.
118Cassegård, p. 698.
24
to things not considered disruptive of the norms of public communication itself.”119 Thus, public 
spaces may serve the critical cause better than the public sphere in many cases. Both types of public 
spaces play a crucial role in the expansion of the political discourse.120 Cassegård concludes:121
To a politics geared to counteract exclusion, public spaces created through contestation can play 
just as crucial a role as public spaces constituted for the excluded through alternative forms of 
bracketing. At whichever of these two senses of public space one looks, one finds a political 
significance that is particularly great to those excluded from or disadvantaged in the politics of 
the public sphere … The correct way to put it is surely that public space is not inherently 
radical, but a crucial and irreducible element in all politics—including that of the public sphere. 
 2.2.4 Summary
In this chapter, the concept of the publics sphere has been discussed. Habermas's initial conception 
of the ideal political public sphere was that of private individuals coming together for rational-
critical, public deliberation, forming public opinion on matters of the state. The idealized political 
function of the public sphere is to make matters public, and to subject them to the control of a 
critical public. This process would justify political domination, and constitute an alternative to 
coercion for social coordination. Rational debate presupposes that individuals bracket their private 
interest in the name of impartiality. This is a problematic conception.
Fraser makes four important points. First, the concept of bracketing has exclusionary consequences 
in the public sphere. Even if there are formal rights of participation, bracketing of social inequalities 
gives advantages to dominant groups. For subordinate groups, strategies of unbracketing may prove 
advantageous for contesting domination. Anyhow, the ideal of participatory parity requires some 
extent of social equality.
Second, this ideal is better achieved with a multiplicity of publics, than in a single public sphere. 
This goes for both stratified and egalitarian societies. In a stratified society, the creation of subaltern 
counterpublics is advantageous for subordinate groups. Such counterpublics help expand the 
discursive space by publicly contesting assumptions previously exempted from the debate. This is 
achieved even if the counterpublic is anti-democratic or anti-egalitarian. Self-identifying as a public 
has an inherently widening, inclusionary potential, that prevents the counterpublic from becoming 
separatistic, or an enclave. Still, there is danger of being enclaved by dominant groups. There is a 
dialectic in the functions of subaltern counterpublics; they can both serve as places for retreat and 
regrouping, and as vehicles for contestation. This means that it enables them to counteract the 
119Cassegård, p. 699.
120Cassegård, p. 699–701.
121Cassegård, p. 699–702.
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participatory privileges of dominant social groups. This is their emancipatory potential.
Egalitarian, multicultural societies, requires a multiplicity of publics by definition. Here, the publics 
constitute the arenas for the formation and enactment of social identities, and have a function in the 
formation of discursive opinion. There would still be a need for a comprehensive public sphere, 
where issues that concern all could be debated across the lines of diversity.
Third, the relegation of certain topics to a private sphere is a way to preclude matters from 
discussion in the public sphere. Which matters can be debated should not be decided on in advance. 
Redefining that which is considered private as political is important for all struggles against 
oppression. 
Fourth, the concepts of strong and weak publics enables a critical discussion of the public sphere. 
Weak publics are opinion-forming associations of civil society, without decision-making power. 
Strong publics have both opinion-forming and decision-making power; they are the sovereign 
parliaments. Weak publics are crucial to the critical function of the public sphere. Political parties 
can constitute weak publics, but they tend to fuse with the state. 
Cassegård clarifies the concept of public space, and the two dimensions of publicness, bracketing 
and contestation. Excluded from the public sphere, subordinate groups can turn to public spaces for 
emancipation. “Counterspaces” are the public spaces of contestation, where strategies of 
unbracketing are employed to publicly manifest dissent and to question inequalities. “No-man’s-
land” are public spaces that feed on the neglect of mainstream society, places for empowerment, 
survival and regrouping, where alternative principles of bracketing are employed to free the 
inhabitants from stigma. The two dimensions are not necessarily incompatible, and they coincide 
within the classical notion of the public sphere. Bracketing facilitates communication, but with the 
effect that contestation, a necessary component for critical debate, is contained. This shows that 
bracketing is not a uniform concept. Public space is thus a crucial and irreducible element in the 
politics of the public sphere. Next, let us develop the themes of rationality and participation a little 
further.
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 2.3 The Process of Rational Debate in the Public Sphere
 2.3.1 Participation
The problem of participation, and participatory parity, is a central theme throughout this thesis. Let 
us treat this matter more. Manin, in his discussion on legitimacy, states the following:122
As political decisions are characteristically imposed on all, it seems reasonable to seek, as an 
essential condition for legitimacy, the deliberation of all or, more precisely, the right of all to 
participate in deliberation.
The aim of the deliberative process is “to broaden the participants' information and enable them to 
discover their own preferences”.123 By defending their positions, refuting the arguments of their 
opponents and perhaps reconsidering their own, the participants of deliberation may come to a 
decision. This process is both individual and collective; it requires a multitude of conflicting views 
in order to be achieved.124 Thus, in other words, deliberation itself is the true goal of pluralism, and 
it is necessary that minorities are able to participate in the process of deliberation.125 
Manin argues (reiterating liberal thought) that the majority will should be checked.126 The concept 
he proposes “does not justify the sovereignty of the majority”.127 All (except, for instance, children) 
should have “the rights to vote and to participate in deliberation”.128 This provides an answer to 
Mill's classic riddle whether one has the right to sell oneself to slavery.129 This necessitates the 
rights and freedoms (“freedom of conscience, of opinion, of speech, and of association”) necessary 
to realize such participation. The point is, that:130
[T]he majority must be forbidden to exclude any group from the deliberative body on the 
pretext that it disagrees with the majority, however overwhelming this majority may be. The 
majority should also not be permitted to eliminate the diversity of proposed solutions.
 2.3.2 Truth and Rationality 
Absolute truth is not a matter for the political public sphere, according to Manin:131
122Manin, 352.
123Manin, p. 352.
124Manin, p. 352.
125Manin, p. 360–2.
126Manin, p. 361.
127Manin, p. 362.
128Manin, p. 362.
129Weinstein, p. 26–7. Cf. Mill, p. 195–196. The answer is, of course, no.
130Manin, p. 362.
131Manin, p. 354. Cf. Habermas (1992), p. 450.
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In the political sphere, deliberation does not permit us to arrive at necessary and universally 
admitted truths, but it also does not permit the absolute and incontestable refutation of a norm or 
a value.
A similar standpoint is apparent in classic liberal thought, when Mill argues that “[c]omplete liberty 
of contradicting and disproving our opinion, is the very condition which justifies us in assuming its 
truth for purposes of action”.132 
Habermas, drawing on Rawls and Dworkin's (among other) discussion on the moral point of 
view,133 states two conditions for communication in a rational debate, “the presumption of 
impartiality and the expectation that the participants question and transcend whatever their initial 
preferences may have been”.134 These preconditions should be guaranteed through legislation. 
Habermas also points to some interesting implications for the debate, also confirming Manins point 
stated above:135
These idealizing preconditions demand the complete inclusion of all parties that might be 
affected, their equality, free and easy interaction, no restrictions of topics and topical 
contributions, the possibility of revising the outcomes, etc. In this context the legal procedures 
serve to uphold within an empirically existing community of communication the spatial, 
temporal, and substantive constraints on choices that are operative within a presumed ideal one.
Thus, the conditions for communication in rational debate precludes the possibility of deciding on 
absolute truths in the course of such a debate. But rationality is troublesome. As will be developed 
below,136 such conditions for participation have exclusionary implications for subordinate groups, 
deemed “irrational” on the basis of their substantive moral differences.137 Does it make sense to 
build a political theory based on rational consensus in a reality characterized by a “plurality of 
evaluative and interpretative standpoints”?138 The demand for complete inclusion at the same time 
seems to have inherently exclusionary tendencies. On the other hand, it has been argued that 
cultural relativism and democratic polity are incompatible.139 Rational consensus of some kind 
could be pitched against a Hobbesian state of nature, a war of all against all.140 Where, and how, to 
draw the line?
132Mill, p. 35.
133Habermas (1992), p. 447.
134Habermas (1992), p. 449.
135Habermas (1992), p. 449.
136Cf. ch. 2.4 below.
137Cf. Cassegård, p. 695.
138Thompson, p. 184–5.
139Garnham, p. 369.
140Garnham, p. 375.
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 2.3.3 Summary
This chapter has highlighted matters of participation, truth and rationality. The right of all to 
participate in deliberation, once again, is an essential condition for the legitimacy of the outcome of 
the debate. The aim of the deliberative process is to aid its participants in discovering their own 
preferences, and to provide them with new information. For this, a multitude of conflicting views is 
necessary. Therefore, minorities must participate. A universal right of participation necessitates the 
freedoms of conscience, opinion, speech, and association. Dissenting minority groups must not be 
excluded.
Decisions of the political public sphere cannot be treated as absolute truths, as everything must be 
contestable. There are two preconditions for communication in a rational debate, known as the 
moral point of view in liberal theory: the presumption of impartiality and the expectation that the 
participants question and transcend their initial preferences. Somewhat paradoxically considering 
the above discussion, “[t]hese idealizing preconditions demand the complete inclusion of all parties 
that might be affected, their equality, free and easy interaction, no restrictions of topics and topical 
contributions, the possibility of revising the outcomes, etc”.141 Although notions of rationality may 
function exclusionary, it has been argued that some kind of consensus is necessary in a society. Are 
there any alternatives to rational consensus? 
 2.4 Alternatives to Rationality?
 2.4.1 Limiting Rationality
Malik criticizes the traditional liberal theory that presents liberal democracy as rational consensus 
(which happens to be the same concept that Habermas utilizes above).142 Malik illustrates her 
argument with Rawls, whose theory “limits public debate to those comprehensive doctrines that 
recognize the limits imposed by: (a) deep diversity and pluralism; and (b) public reason.”143 To 
participate in the public sphere, according to this theory, a group has to accept general principles of 
justice, and relegate their substantive ethics to a private sphere. When a group refuses to do this, the 
group is taken for irrational or mad, which make it difficult for it to take part in public debate, and 
may make it necessary for the group to be contained. Malik argues that theories like this too quickly 
141Habermas (1992), p. 449.
142Malik, p. 109.
143Malik, p. 108.
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abandons the public debate, and they fail “to link our discussions of justice and political legitimacy 
to the reality of political claims and struggles”.144 Malik writes that145
the most pressing democratic struggles in our times … is often by those ‘extremists’ who seek 
to enter public discourse, and yet whose claims seem, at first sight, to be irreconcilable with 
liberal democratic politics.
Ryan argues that a politics of contestation and inclusion, where notions of interest and identity are 
articulated, does not have to be antithetical to the public good, but rather, history (i.e. of history 
women's inclusion in the public sphere) has showed that such a politics is “as essential to the public 
as is a standard of rational and disinterested discourse”.146 From her feminist revisionist history of 
the public sphere, she concludes that:147
Those most remote from public authorities and governmental institutions and least versed in 
their language sometimes resort to shrill tones, civil disobedience, and even violent acts in order 
to make themselves heard … However we draw the normative or procedural boundaries of the 
public sphere, they must be permeable to even distorted voices of people like these, many of 
whom still remain outside its reach. 
Deeming a group irrational thus seems to be a very risky business in a democracy.
 2.4.2 Agonistic Respect
Malik “proposes an alternative way of defining the goals of liberal politics”.148 Thus, still within a 
liberal framework, she introduces the concept of “agonistic respect”, balanced against the theory of 
deliberative democracy and its discourse ethics. 
Agonistic respect “emphasizes the importance of a complex notion of political identity, but it does 
not seek rational consensus as a goal” and it “welcomes the introduction of ‘difference’ into the 
public sphere rather than relegating it to the private sphere”.149 These notions prevent liberalism 
from becoming a dogma, providing space for new ideas. It also “recognizes that an individual's 
political identity may transcend national boundaries … thereby providing an ideal paradigm for 
considering the ‘global context’ of extremism”.150 Such a concept places great importance on the 
144Malik, p. 108.
145Malik, p. 108. Cf. Ryan, p. 285, who concludes that a lesson from the history of women's history of politics consists 
in a warning “against a spatial or conceptual closure that constrains the ideal of the public to a bounded sphere with 
a priori rules about appropriate behavior therein.” 
146Ryan, p. 285.
147Ryan, p. 285–6.
148Malik, p. 96.
149Malik, p. 110.
150Malik, p. 110. The other side, not that of individuals but that of the law itself, too could be subject to a discussion 
transcending national boundaries. Cf. Heinze (2009a) pp. 186–7, when, in his comparison of the US and European 
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procedural aspects of democracy, that is, agreement on a framework for debate, rather than 
substantive ones. Such a framework, argues Malik, can be provided by the theory of deliberative 
democracy and its discourse ethics.151
 2.4.3 The Discourse Ethics of Deliberative Democracy
Malik argues that “[m]odels of deliberative democracy provide a more expansive way of defining 
the public sphere”, in that it152
– (a) encourages discourse about the lines separating the public from the private sphere;
– (b) also locates the public sphere in civic society and is therefore more sensitive to the 
interaction between the two; and 
– (c) focuses on fluid processes for forming opinions in the public sphere.
– [d] Most importantly, unlike the Rawlsian model, this way of thinking about democracy 
opens up some room for connecting national (or international) public discussion and politics 
with the more private (individual or group) claims of social groups. 
The discourse ethics of deliberative democracy, according to Malik, consists of two foundational 
principles, universal moral respect (“recognizing the right of all beings capable of speech and action 
to be participants in the moral conversation”) and egalitarian reciprocity (“each individual should 
have the right to speech acts, to initiate conversations and new topics and to ask for justifications for 
the model itself”).153 These principles boils down into three important constraints on the process of 
deliberation. These constraints coincides with the three liberal core values, or individual rights, 
identified by Benhabib, who argues that they are “compatible with a universalist deliberative 
democracy model”.154 These values are:155
(1) egalitarian reciprocity (that members of minorities must be entitled to the same rights as the 
majority);
(2) voluntary self-ascription (self-identification and self-ascription with group membership may be 
free speech, the focus is on the jurisdiction of the Council of Europe, as compared to that of the US Constitution.
151Malik, p. 111.
152Malik, p. 112. Malik mixes the plural and singular forms of “model” in this section.
153Malik, p. 112.
154Benhabib (2002), p. 19.
155Cf. Malik, pp. 98–9, and Benhabib (2002), pp. 19–20. The value of egalitarian reciprocity is indeed in line with 
liberal thought, cf. Mill, p. 96: “If Christians would teach infidels to be just to Christianity, they should themselves 
be just to infidelity.”
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contested by the group, but should be left to the individual as far as possible); and 
(3) freedom of exit and association (of/with the group). 
These principles serve three functions: The level of extremism of a group, and its development over 
time, can be determined by the extent to which it deviate from them. These principles are also the 
preconditions for groups to enter the public discourse. Finally, they “set the minimal standard of 
protection that the State must guarantee for vulnerable individuals within groups”.156 The 
universality of these constraints “is a major compromise to the principle of agonistic respect”157 but 
it allows for this principle to be applied within “institutionalized liberal politics”.158 This 
“framework of discourse ethics […] is a precondition for all participants in public discourse”.159
The result, argues Malik, is a wider, more allowing, definition of the public sphere. “Extremist” 
groups accepting the procedural framework can now partake in public deliberation. It is critical that 
the focus is on “process (normative syntax) in a way that distinguishes it from substantive moral 
content (normative justification)”.160 This process will legitimize its outcomes (political norms). 
Malik states that it, in addition, will “enhance the virtues of democratic citizenship” of its 
participants (including “extremists”).161 
Later period Habermas gives us a hint of a more modest, minimal definition of rational consensus, 
not as precondition for entering the debate, but as a precondition for the existence of debate in the 
first place:162
I think that [the regulative function of consensus] can only be identified against the background 
of the intended agreement. There are conceptual necessities, but beyond these conceptual 
necessities there are pragmatic presuppositions. What would it mean to have a discussion if we 
did not presuppose the possibility that we can agree, and of course disagree, on certain issues 
and propositions? It wouldn't be meaningful. 
What are the implications of Malik's proposal for the debate on the criminalization of incitement to 
hatred? This will be discussed in the next chapter.
 2.4.4 Summary
This chapter was centered around Malik's discussion of her model to engage with extremists. Not 
156Malik, pp. 98–9, quote on p. 99. Cf. Benhabib (2002), pp. 19–20.
157Malik, p. 112.
158Malik. p. 113.
159Malik, p. 116.
160Malik, p. 113.
161Malik, p. 113. Cf. the discussion on the transformative potential, 2.5 below.
162Calhoun et. al. (ed.), p. 477.
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all groups will accept general principles of justice and relegate their substantive ethics to a private 
sphere, in order to participate in public debate. Groups that refuse participation on such grounds, 
should not be condemned as irrational and mad too quickly. It is important to see that even illiberal 
extremist groups often try to enter the public debate. Politics of contestation and inclusion are 
argued for the public, not antithetical to, but just as essential as a standard of rational and 
disinterested discourse.
In Malik's model, the principle of agonistic respect does not seek rational consensus as a goal. It 
allows for complex identities, including nation-transcending ones. The emphasis is on the process, 
rather than on substantive aspects. This principle is balanced by the discourse ethics of deliberative 
democracy. These ethics have two foundational principles, universal moral respect and egalitarian 
reciprocity, that place three constraints on the principle of agonistic respect. These constraints are 
identical to the proposed core values of liberalism: egalitarian reciprocity (that members of 
minorities must be entitled to the same rights as the majority); voluntary self-ascription (self-
identification and self-ascription with group membership may be contested by the group, but should 
be left to the individual as far as possible); and freedom of exit and association. They function as 
standards to classify extremism, preconditions to enter public debate, and the minimal standard of 
state protection of vulnerable individuals. Malik argues that with her model, it is easier for 
extremists to participate, something that legitimizes the outcome of the deliberations. I have to note, 
however, that her proposed preconditions for participation seem rather strict. Perhaps an even more 
allowing model could be found in Habermas's later, minimal definition of rational consensus. Here, 
rational consensus is a precondition for the existence of debate in the first place; debate makes no 
sense if the participants do not agree on the possibility of consensus. Now, let us turn to the 
implications of this discussion for the criminalization of incitement to hatred.
 2.5 Hate speech
 2.5.1 Hate Speech Criminalization
It has been argued that hate speech should be restricted by the state because it “invades the rights of 
its targets” and “violates the basic rules that should govern democratic debate”.163 Malik questions 
the effectivity of criminalization of incitement to hatred. She shows that incitement legislation 
historically has been used to suppress minorities criticizing the British colonial rule. She then 
163Heyman, p. 181.
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argues that contemporary debate on the topic fails to address the essential topic: that of the actual 
harm caused by hate speech. Malik states that it is in fact the mainstream public discourse that 
constitutes the “most powerful source of hate speech against vulnerable minorities such as 
Muslims”.164 But such mainstream discourse is not susceptible to hate speech legislation.165 Malik 
argues that, as the normalization of prejudices and stereotypes in mainstream media may in fact 
pose a greater threat to minorities, media regulation and the enabling of more speech and 
possibilities for minorities to participate in the public discourse, is a non-legal strategy superior to 
criminalization.166 
Malik concludes that, in the place of hate speech criminalization, her proposed framework of 
discourse ethics “performs three key functions in the process of engaging with extremists”. These 
are, as mentioned above, that the framework “enables the classification of extremists”, “provides 
protection for vulnerable individuals who may be at risk from extremist ideas and practices” and it 
“permits and facilitates liberal critique of extremist groups without excluding them from the public 
sphere”.167 Groups that does not strive for participation in mainstream society are not allowed to 
mistreat individuals within the group in violation of the liberal core norms, and while the public 
sphere is defined by inclusion and understanding in relation to new ideas, the challenge will be to 
“maintain an authentic critical perspective towards these”.168
Malik does not describe what level of coercion the actual legal responses to extremism would entail. 
Not putting up hard barriers against anti-democratic extremism could be the subject of criticism for 
being naïve. For instance, the Weimar democracy of Germany gave rise to the Nazi regime. But, as 
Heinze notes, “[t]he Weimar democracy cannot seriously compare with today's democracies in any 
relevant respect”.169 It is important not to make the fallacy of ahistoricism, i.e. to take “ a snapshot 
of one historical moment” and use it “to provide a general depiction of the society, eclipsing other, 
contrasting histories”.170 Today, anti-democratic parties are banned in Germany.171 Heinze, too, is an 
opponent of hate speech bans, but he stresses that his argument concern hate speech bans in “stable, 
prosperous, and longstanding democracies”.172 In emerging democracies, or in a state of emergency, 
164Malik, pp. 103–5, quote on p. 105. Cf. Heinze (2009a), p. 197 for a further discussion.
165Malik, p. 105.
166Malik, pp. 105–6.
167Malik, p. 116.
168Malik, p. 116–7, quote on p. 117.
169Heinze (2009a), p. 202. 
170Heinze (2009a), p. 202.
171Barendt, p. 169. As a result of this history, and perhaps justly so, the German Basic law approves of measures 
against attempts (speech is not enough) to overthrow the democratic system. Thus, Germany is dubbed a militant 
democracy, cf. Grimm, p. 14.
172Heinze (2009a), p. 202. Cf. Heinze (2009b), p. 280.
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perhaps such bans can serve as temporary measures.173 He points out that as long as “hate speech 
bans are not, and cannot be, extended to protect all vulnerable individuals or groups, they violate 
[the] principle of universality”.174 Such stable democracies, he claims, are able to protect their 
minorities and vulnerable groups “without having to impose inevitably arbitrary limits on 
speech”.175 
 2.5.2 The Case of Pastor Green Part I
In this context, let us have a look at the Swedish case of Pastor Green, an evangelical pastor who 
was indicted for incitement to hatred of people on the basis of their sexual preferences (Sweden's 
Criminal Code Chapter 16, section 8). Pastor Green was acquitted by the Supreme Court, that made 
a narrow interpretation of the Swedish law in light of the freedom of expression and the freedom of 
religion as formulated in the European Convention of Human Rights Articles 9 and 10, and 
subsequent case law.176 The Supreme Court ruled against what could be argued to have been the 
intention of the parliament, which “had legislated relatively recently so as to include sexual 
preferences in the incitement crime”.177 The case accentuated questions of conflict of norms178, in 
this case the national criminalization of incitement to hatred, pitched against the freedom of 
expression as stated in the European Convention of Human Rights,179 or arguably even against the 
civil rights as stated in the Constitution of Sweden.180 Österdahl argues that the European Court of 
Human Rights might have supported a Swedish ruling against Pastor Green on the basis that his 
conduct could have been seen as a denial of rights according to Article 17, on the condition that the 
Court would consider homophobic statements as objectionable as their racist counterparts.181 It is 
unclear how the European Court of Human Rights would have ruled if this case was ever brought 
before it.182 Bull, commenting the case and calling for a more theoretical discussion on the matter, 
notes that the traditional conceptions of freedom of expression are having problems when facing 
matters of extreme speech.183 He argues that the protection of undemocratic expression serves to 
173Heinze (2009b), p. 280.
174Heinse (2009b), p. 281.
175Heinze (2009b), p. 285.
176NJA 2005:805, p. 830–1. The Supreme Court notes on p. 830 that this case was not a matter of hate speech in the 
sense of ECHR case law. Cf. also Cameron, p. 132–3, and Danelius, pp. 39–40, 427 and 465.
177Cameron, p. 139. Cf. Prop. 2001/02:59.
178And deemed there not to be an actual conflict of norms, cf. NJA 2005:805, pp. 830–1.
179Cameron, p. 193. Cf. NJA 2005:805, p. 830–31. Cf. also Österdahl, p. 221, who observes that it in the Swedish 
preparatory works is stated that the freedom of expression does not protect contemptuous speech directed towards 
minorities, but also that the criminalization of incitement to hatred must not restrict the freedom of expression. Cf. 
Prop. 2001/02:59, p. 36.
180Österdahl, p. 222.
181Österdahl, p. 218.
182Österdahl, p. 219.
183Bull, p. 534.
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further democracy (even if those very expressions do not) and could be taken for a proof of a 
society's democratic strength.184
While the case of Pastor Green raises interesting and important questions,185 my aim here is not to 
comment on the positive law of Sweden, but to use make use of the relevant circumstances of the 
case in order to illustrate my discussion on deliberative democracy.186 Here follows a brief summary 
of those circumstances.
In the small community of Borgholm, on July 20, 2003, evangelical Pastor Åke Green gave a 
sermon in a local church, on the topic “Is Homosexuality a Congenital Urge or Evil Powers' Play 
with Men?”187 The sermon was, according to Pastor Green, a response to recent gay parades and the 
extensive media coverage these groups had received. Green was of the opinion that his and his 
God's thoughts on the matter should receive equal media coverage. His aim was primarily to reach 
young people on the verge of becoming homosexual and to stop them from this, and to “convert” 
already homosexual people. In order to achieve this, Pastor Green contacted local media in advance 
to invite them to the sermon. None came, but afterwards Green distributed a transcript of the 
sermon, which was subsequently printed in one newspaper, resulting in his indictment.188 
As for the contents of the sermon, citing the Bible, Pastor Green made his case against what he 
considered the sickness of homosexuality. The statement considered most far-reaching by the 
Supreme Court is one where “sexual abnormalities” (including homosexuality) is likened to a 
cancer on the societal body.189 He also links homosexuality with HIV/AIDS,190 pedophilia,191 God's 
punishment in the shape of disaster and death,192 and concludes that christians cannot be 
homosexuals, and, of course, that homosexual people cannot go to heaven.193 He is horrified by the 
fact that homosexual people are openly kissing each other on TV and in public places.194 The case 
of Pastor Green will be discussed in the light of a theory of deliberative democracy below.195
184Bull, p. 535. Bull, on p. 534, also correctly notes that rights applies to dissenting unsympathetic persons, too.
185Cf. Bull, p. 534, on the implications for constitutional law.
186This illustrative discussion will be conducted below in chapter 3.3.
187NJA 2005:805, p. 812. "Ar homosexualitet en medfödd drift eller onda makters spel med människor?" In mine own 
translation.
188NJA 2005:805, p. 812–3. His struggles to reach the media are also mentioned in the sermon on p. 808.
189NJA 2005:805, p. 809, cf. p. 830.
190NJA 2005:805, p. 806.
191NJA 2005:805, p. 810. The Swedish word “gosseskändare” (defiler of boys) is utilized as well.
192NJA 2005:805, p. 809–10.
193NJA 2005:805, p. 811.
194NJA 2005:805, p. 806–7.
195Below, in chapter 3.3.
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 2.5.3 Summary
Hate speech is bad, because it invades the rights of whomever it targets, and it violates the rules that 
should govern debate. But the criminalization of incitement to hatred is not effective, and the actual 
harm caused by hate speech is not addressed in the debates. In fact, mainstream public discourse is 
the most powerful source of hate speech, through the normalization of prejudices and stereotypes in 
mainstream media. But that discourse is not susceptible to criminalization. For vulnerable 
minorities, free speech is more effective than restrictions of it. Malik propose that making space in 
public debate with more free speech, in combination with regulation of the media, could serve as 
non-legal alternatives to criminalization. The challenge consists, she argues, in welcoming new 
ideas while remaining critical towards them. It was was also argued that hate speech bans violate 
the principle of universality, and constitute arbitrary limits on free speech. While perhaps necessary 
when democracy is weak, it was argued that stable, prosperous, and longstanding democracies are 
able to protect minorities and vulnerable individuals without hate speech criminalization. Also, the 
circumstances of the Swedish case of Pastor Green have been expounded, and will be discussed 
further below. But first: What are the alternatives to coercion? Let us delve into the topic of the 
transformative potential of deliberation.
 2.6 The Transformative Potential of Deliberation
The proponents of deliberative democracy stresses the transformative potential of deliberation. 
Within the self-identification of a group as a “public”, there is an inherent inclusionary potential, as 
discussed above.196 Gutmann discusses the hopes Mill had for liberal democracy to educate “public 
opinion to respect individual liberty, a possibility which if realized would permit democracy to do 
without any constraints on popular rule”,197 and concludes that such a result has yet to be realized, 
and is hard to imagine in a foreseeable future. But for a deliberative democracy, there may still be a 
chance:198
The more political life encourages autonomy, the more agonizing decisions may become. But 
the level of political acrimony and violence may decrease as citizens learn to respect each other 
as deliberative, rather than merely wilful or self-interested, beings … And greater public 
deliberation may also lead to more justifiable public policies. These are among the most 
inspiring prospects democracy has to offer.
196 Cf. section 2.2.2.2.
197Gutmann, p. 524. Cf. Mill, ch. II.
198Gutmann, p. 530.
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Manin too, argues that while political deliberation and argumentation places demands on its 
participants and audience, they also, as showed by Mill, “constitute processes of education and of 
training in themselves”.199 
Malik discusses this transformative potential in relation to the risk of extremist groups making 
strategic agreements while using the process of deliberative democracy to mask their true, anti-
democratic intents. She identifies three different types of agreements between actors in the public 
sphere, that have different consequences for the potentially agreeing extremist group:200
– (1) Procedural agreement: agreeing on the minimum requirements and normative basis 
for entering into political discourse based on principles such as universal humanity or 
egalitarian reciprocity; 
– (2) Principled substantive agreement: the outcome of argument which rests on identical 
reasons and that are able to convince parties in the same way; and 
– (3) Compromised agreement: a compromise and negotiated solution based on different 
reasons between the various parties to the discourse; (Rawls' overlapping 
consensus/modus vivendi would fall into this category). 
Malik argues that strategic agreements have transformative potential. Even if an extremist group 
can go as far as making even a compromised agreement only for strategic purposes, the complex 
relationship between the public and private spheres, and the corresponding dialogical formation of 
the public and private identities of individuals, may transform this compromised agreement, given 
time, into a principled substantive agreement. Deliberative democracy, Malik argues, carries a 
potential of fundamental transformation for all its participants. But this “requires an understanding 
that democratic processes are intrinsically important (whilst also being limited by the normative 
principles of ethics).201
Habermas himself––in a response to Kramer's question of the appropriate responses to those who 
does not accept the consensus of the public sphere, if “despite your clear desire to exclude violence 
from the public sphere, isn't it always, in some sense, dependent on an implicit or explicit threat or 
use of violence?”––states (somewhat cryptically) that:202
199Manin, p. 354.
200Malik, p. 114.
201Malik, pp. 114–5, quote on p. 115.
202Calhoun et. al. (ed.), “Concluding Remarks”, pp. 475–6.
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I would question only the word ''always." Every public sphere I know still depends on violence. 
Nevertheless, what is the outcome of this criticism? If it has any impact, it is to redefine the 
conditions of access and the level of discussion to do away with the identified exclusionary 
mechanism. Now, you ask, must it not always be that? This is only the case if the measures of 
institutions of procedural rationality are in principle a contradictory enterprise. Must the attempt 
to find rules that, under ideal conditions, could be recognized for all parts of the world 
necessarily reflect one's own interests, desires, identities, and so on? I can't see how one can 
make such an a priori argument. Historically, there is also evidence for the self-corrective 
process of overcoming the selections by which all public spheres as complete embodiments of 
that one idea [of procedural rationality] have been marred. So we are back to the question, Is 
procedural rationality an idea on which all publics can agree? If so, there is a regulatory 
embodiment that can be interpreted differently from different parts but that is seen by all parts 
as the best embodiment of that idea of procedural impartiality at a given time, in a given 
context, for the time being. That means until the next argument is able to show how in fact 
everything is biased. I think that is the issue: procedural rationality. 
To summarize, this chapter has discussed the transformative potential of deliberative democracy. In 
a group's self-identification as a public there lies an inherently inclusionary potential. There is also a 
transformative potential in the process of deliberation, where participants gradually educate 
themselves and nurture a mutual respect. Such a transformation may lessen the need for restraints 
on popular rule. At the same time as the public policies become more justifiable, political acrimony 
and violence might also decrease, lessening the need for repression in general.
Malik argued that even if an extremist, anti-democratic group partakes in public debate for strategic 
purposes only, given time, their strategic agreement may be transformed into a real one. It is 
important to stress the intrinsic value of the democratic processes.
However, these processes must be constrained, or governed, by some kind of ethics. These ethics 
would probably be in the form of law, with accompanying sanctions. Habermas's last comment 
could be interpreted as stating that violence is necessary in society to the extent that participatory 
parity fails. If only a consensus could be reached, however minimal, on a rational procedure for 
deliberation, and if this consensus were not exclusionary, perhaps violence could be avoided.
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 3 Discussions and Conclusions
 3.1 On Legitimacy
The principles of modern individualism states that individuals are free and equal, and that the 
individual will is the sole source of legitimate obligation. With the conventional understanding of 
individual will as something already formed at the point of decision-making, what follows is the 
principle of unanimity, i.e. that only rules that all affected individuals can accept are legitimate. For 
practical purposes, however, this principle is substituted with the majority principle. This, then 
necessitates a conception of rights in order to counter the tyranny of the majority. Rights, of course, 
also applies in between individuals. 
If, instead, the will of the individuals is conceived of as something that is formed through the 
process of deliberation, the principle of participatory parity can replace the principle of unanimity. 
Rights can be conceived of as having a crucial function in the fulfillment of this principle. 
Thus, the problem consists in how to meet the demands of the individualist principle. What of 
individuals that do not agree with the decision arrived upon? In systems based on unanimity, 
substituted with majority rule, and then countered with rights, legitimacy can be questioned to the 
extent that individuals disagree with the decisions. Social contract theories try to alleviate this by 
stating that the individual may disagree with particular norms, but agree with the legitimacy of their 
origins, e.g. the constitution. In systems based on participatory parity, legitimacy stems from the 
process of will-formation, rather than from the will itself. There will of course still exist dissenting 
individuals. But to the extent that their points of view has been heard and debated, the outcome of 
the process is still considered legitimate. This could be described as a weaker derivation of 
legitimacy than that of the conventional version. On the other hand, conventional models have to 
provide fictional theoretical constructions to legitimate their norms, while the deliberative model 
provides a more practical, and perhaps, an even more realistic solution. This claim, however, 
weakens to the extent that actual participation is substituted with opportunity of participation. 
 3.2 On Deliberation 
The discussion on the concept of the public sphere has shown a number of things. The participants 
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in a public sphere must be prepared to reevaluate their positions during the course of debate. This 
can be described as a perceived possibility of consensus, which, even if such a consensus is never 
reached, is precondition for the existence of debate. Thus it can be argued that for such a possibility 
of consensus to exist, there must be some level of rationality in the debate. 
For the deliberations to be rational, private interests must be bracketed in the public sphere. This has 
problematic implications for the participatory parity, and thus for the legitimacy of the system. It 
has been argued that bracketing, or notions of neutrality, or the relegation of private interests and 
structural conflicts to a private sphere, while facilitating communication, serves to promote the 
interests of dominant groups within the public sphere. Bracketing seems to contradict the critical, or 
contesting function of the public sphere. This could be alleviated, to some extent within a stratified 
society, with the promotion of a multiplicity of publics, where subordinate groups can form opinion 
and gather strength outside the reach of the dominant groups. From these bases of empowerment, 
subordinate groups could launch (discursive) attacks and contest structural inequalities. With the 
strength of a counterpublic behind them, members of subordinate groups could perhaps achieve 
some kind of participatory parity within a comprehensive public sphere. 
One important point, though, is that participatory parity still requires some level of social equality. 
The public deliberation, once again, requires some level of rationality, which requires some level of 
bracketing of private interests. To the extent that there are social inequalities among those bracketed 
interests, the discussion promotes the interests of dominant groups and exclude subordinate groups, 
and thus fails to live up to the parity requirement. One could even go as far as to suggest that the 
ideal of the public sphere is impossible in a stratified society. It could also be argued that the parity 
requirement is contained within the liberal theory of the moral point of view. The precondition of 
presumption of impartiality, in this theory, is nothing but fiction without some substantive equality. 
Then again, were the liberal legitimations ever intended for practical use? Anyway, the result is 
politically radical in that it provides a strong case for a rough, substantive equality.
Malik's model, balancing agonistic respect and discourse ethics to engage with extremist groups, is 
an example of how some practical tools could be drawn from the theory of discourse ethics. While 
she argues that her model is more inclusive than a model based on rationality, it must be noted that 
the conditions she propose are set rather high. Anyway, she proposes a framework that arguably 
could be applied within a liberal context, and it also explicitly develops from liberal core values the 
standards to classify extremism, the preconditions to enter public debate, and a minimal required 
standard of state protection of vulnerable individuals. The vision of deliberative democracy, then, 
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while possible to accent to the point that it becomes utopian (my personal inclinations certainly 
leans towards this), might have practical applications here and now. Such applications are 
accommodated, too, by the different strategies proposed by Fraser and Cassegård. 
 3.3 An Illustration––the Case of Pastor Green Part II
Now, let us look again at the above presented case of Pastor Green. From the viewpoint of 
deliberative democracy, Pastor Green's freedom of expression must, of course, be protected. He 
does not seem to propagate violence (other than that of his God) towards homosexuals. While he is 
horrified to see homosexuality in media and in the streets, his response is to try to enter the public 
debate. He does not explicitly try to exclude homosexual people from the debate (although he tries 
to “convert” them). While I am not inclined to applaud his argument, I can see no reason not to 
allow Pastor Green in the public sphere. Perhaps, on a more sociological note, Pastor Green could 
be understood as being half-ways through the transformative process. As he strives to participate in 
public discourse, he exhibits the hope of possible consensus. Although, by academic standards, his 
rationality could be questioned, and it does not seem like he would be prepared to reevaluate his 
position, he seems to acknowledge his “opponents” as partners in debate. At the same time, though, 
these “opponents” are his targets for conversion. But in entering public debate, Pastor Green will 
have to conceive of himself as part of a public, and in doing so, as mentioned, he already expresses 
a notion of parity in that he should receive equal media coverage as the gay public. His position 
could be described as a possible strategic agreement in framework of Malik. Perhaps, then, his 
transformation could already be well under way. 
While Green, as implied above, could not be said to be anti-democratic, his substantive views 
certainly disregards the principle of individualism, that all individuals are free and equal, and thus 
could be said to be undemocratic. But as Malik points out, it is the mainstream media discourse that 
poses the greatest threat to vulnerable minorities. She suggest some kind of media regulation, but 
also points out that it is the normalization of stereotypes and prejudices that is the outcome to be 
avoided. Pastor Green should thus be met, not with indictment, but with massive debate. However, 
allowing undemocratic views, such as those of the Pastor, to the public sphere should be done with 
great care to the extent that they are perceived to contradict the fundamental ideals of democracy. 
There is always the danger that the resulting debate becomes simplified and polarized. The 
conclusion is that a great responsibility rests on the shoulders of decision-makers within the media. 
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The media, to some extent, can be said to make up parts of the public sphere, with all that this 
entails. Exclusion against the will of the excluded, in all its forms, must be avoided. If the entering 
of one group in the public sphere makes difficult the inclusion of another, the theory faces a 
problem analogous to that of balancing rights in the liberal model. But the deliberative model rooted 
in participatory parity, I suggest, provides a more coherent theory when dealing with issues like 
these.
 3.4 Concluding Visions and Fears
There are many implications of the discussions in this thesis. For instance, how would this theory 
apply to criminal law? Of course, for criminalization to be legitimate, the prospective criminal 
would have to have had a chance to participate in the public discourse. And how to deal with 
separatist groups, threatening others with violence? Most instances of terrorism, for instance, could 
perhaps be understood as consequences of long-running breaches of the principle of participatory 
parity by the powers at be (i.e. the West and other powers asserting their policies on subordinate 
groups all over the world). In the light of the discussed transformative potential, notions of 
transformative justice come to mind. Such matters clearly requires more careful considerations, but 
are outside the reach of this thesis.
There is a danger that a theory of deliberative democracy could be used as a justification for 
undemocratic rule, in small or large scale associations, where processes of deliberation would only 
amount to hearing people out in order to create an air of legitimacy, followed by a decision made by 
an elite (local or national government or perhaps a company management). The theory of 
deliberative democracy could as such be interpreted as to legitimize vast transgressions against 
what many Westerners hold to be human rights, as long as the targets of the transgressions were 
provided with (a sham) opportunity to participate. But with all of its components taken seriously, 
such an ideological degeneration of the concept could hopefully be avoided. 
On the other hand, perhaps isolated aspects of the theory could be abstracted and used as strategies 
for opposing and contesting domination, as mentioned above, through the subaltern counterpublics 
proposed by Fraser and in the public spaces of Cassegård's discussion, or as shown by Malik, by 
providing more space for minorities in a liberal context. As a gradually realized project, or a general 
direction for the development of existing democracies, the transformative potential of the theory 
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suggests that deliberative democracy would, eventually, lead to less repression and violence, and 
more tolerance.
I will note one more aspect here. Liberal values, more directly realized in a theory of deliberative 
democracy, carries within them certain anti-nationalistic implications. A society must perhaps be 
contained within a physical space, but the theory carries an expansive potential. In a world where 
the policies of one entity can affect individuals all over the world, legitimacy, individualism and 
participatory parity taken seriously have far-reaching implications. As a distant echo of socialist 
internationalism, perhaps deliberative democracy can be the vehicle to carry its passengers closer 
towards an utopian, global vision.
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